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CPW Report No. 65-A -- COMMUNIST CHINA

(Mar. 9 - 15, 1953)

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SUMMARY

The masses are regimented for Stalin memorial services, which also monopolize radio time. Russian officials and advisers play a leading role, and printing presses concentrate on publishing works by and about Stalin. From the gigantic efforts of the regime to offer homage to the deceased Soviet dictator there emerges a definite pattern: Stalin is depicted as the symbol of the USSR and the Communist movement. Where heretofore there was impersonal praise of the USSR for saving China from the Japanese and Americans, making the Chinese Communist victory possible, and sending experts to remake China, Stalin now gets personal credit. The new Moscow regime is virtually ignored, and the achievements of the USSR pushed into the background. Stalin, the symbol revered and worshiped by the Chinese, is linked with Sun Yat-sen, their friendship and cooperation is exaggerated, and Stalin is even given full credit for the Chinese Revolution during the past 30 years.

The general impression is that the Chinese Communists apparently recognize a latent fear and distrust of the USSR and its new rulers, but intend to smother this through exaggerated obeisance to Stalin. Sino-Soviet friendship now is a treasure to be "guarded"; the era of friendship and cooperation is the "Stalin era"; and China's secondary place in the partnership is maintained through "appreciation for Stalin."

The emotional pressures generated by worship of Stalin must be transformed into new energies for continuing Stalin's program, including the Korean War. The urge for greater support of the Resist America-Aid Korea movement as a tribute to Stalin's memory is tacit recognition that it is Russia's rather than China's war. It also becomes increasingly clear that the new RAAK drive is essentially a recruitment campaign for needed transport technicians, doctors, and health workers.

Yunnan border trouble is indirectly admitted by the sending of comfort teams to the area, some of them provided with special propaganda material to bolster the morale of fighting units, with loyalty to Stalin stressed as an appeal for greater efforts. In adjoining Sikang, cadres are warned against "feudalistic nationalism" among the minorities.

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